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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Eric Scott Spokas appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing with prejudice
his pro se petition for post-conviction relief, challenging the district court’s denial of his motion
for appointment of counsel.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Spokas included a statement of facts and course of proceedings in his Appellant’s
Brief, which he relies on and incorporates herein.  (See Appellant’s Br., pp.1-2.)
2ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Spokas’ motion for appointment of
counsel?
3ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Spokas’ Motion For Appointment
Of Counsel
The State argues the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Spokas’
motion for appointment of counsel because it concluded he could not meet the higher standard of
avoiding  summary  dismissal  on  the  merits  of  his  petition.   (Respondent’s  Br.,  pp.8-11.)   The
State is incorrect.  The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that the “decision to appoint
counsel and the decision on the merits of the petition if counsel is appointed are controlled by
two different standards.” Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 655 (2007).  A petitioner who files a
motion for appointment of counsel need not show he has a right to relief; instead, he must
“allege[ ]  facts showing the possibility of a valid claim.” Shackleford v. State, 160 Idaho 317,
325 (2016) (quotation marks omitted).  Here, the district court abused its discretion in failing to
apply the proper legal test to Mr. Spokas’ motion for appointment of counsel, and its decision
must be reversed. See Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 893, 902 (2004) (stating a district court abuses
its discretion when, among other things, it does not act “consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it”).
The State relies on Bjorklund v. State, 130 Idaho 373 (Ct. App. 1997), for the proposition
that Mr. Spokas failed to establish even the possibility of a valid claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel because he pled guilty, and cannot challenge his counsel’s trial preparation in a post-
conviction proceeding.  (Respondent’s Br., p.8.)  Critically, the petitioner in Bjorkland did not
file a motion for appointment of counsel, and the district court thus analyzed whether his claims
met the higher standard necessary to avoid summary dismissal on the merits.1 See Bjorkland,
1 In addition, the Bjorkland Court recognized a petitioner’s guilty plea might be involuntary if it
was entered upon the advice of counsel that was not within the range of competence demanded
4130 Idaho at 375; see also Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 24 (Ct. App. 2009) (stating the “threshold
showing that is necessary in order to gain appointment of counsel [is] considerably lower than
that which is necessary to avoid summary dismissal of a petition”).  Where all of a pro se
petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred, the district court may properly deny the petitioner’s
motion for appointment of counsel for failure to raise the possibility of a valid claim. See, e.g.,
Shackelford, 160 Idaho at 326 (concluding petitioner failed to raise the possibility of a valid
claim because all of his claims were procedurally barred).  But a district court may not deny a
motion for appointment of counsel simply because the claims raised in a pro se petition may not
be sufficient to survive summary dismissal.
The State also contends the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Mr. Spokas’ motion for appointment of counsel because Mr. Spokas failed to support his claims
with any admissible facts or evidence.  (Respondent’s Br., p.8.)  The State cites State v. Payne,
146 Idaho 548 (2008), for the proposition that “courts are not ‘required to accept either the
applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s
conclusions of law.’”  (Respondent’s Br., p.7, quoting Payne, 146 Idaho at 561.)  This quotation
is misleading.  This language was used in Payne with respect to the standard for evaluating the
merits of a post-conviction petition, not the standard for evaluating a motion for appointment of
counsel. See Payne, 146 Idaho at 561.  A different, lesser, standard applies to the evaluation of a
motion for appointment of counsel. See Judd, 148 Idaho at 24.  As the Court explained in
Swader, “[A] pro se petitioner may be unable to present sufficient facts showing that his or her
counsel’s performance was deficient or that such deficiency prejudiced the defense.”  143 Idaho
of attorneys in criminal cases. See Bjorkland,  130  Idaho at  376.   That  is  a  claim Mr.  Spokas
could certainly have included in an amended petition had his motion for appointment of counsel
been granted.
5at 654-55.  But that is a reason for granting a motion for appointment of counsel, not denying it.
See id.
Despite being unrepresented by counsel, Mr. Spokas did include additional facts
supporting his claim in his response to the district court’s notice of intent to dismiss.  (See
R., pp.27-30).  The State discounts these facts in a footnote for lack of verification.
(Respondent’s Br., p.9, note 1.)  But the lack of verification stems from the fact Mr. Spokas was
proceeding pro se, and the facts he alleged should not be so easily dismissed.  Mr. Spokas also
argued in his response to the district court’s notice of intent to dismiss that he needed
“[a]dditional  time  and  effective  legal  representation  .  .  .  to  facilitate  the  production  of  the
required  affidavits  of  witnesses  by  whom  such  newly  discovered  evidence  is  to  be  given.”
(R., p.30.)  This is precisely what the Court was concerned with in Swader, and is the reason a
district court must apply a lower standard when evaluating a motion for appointment of counsel
as compared to the merits of a petition.
In Charboneau v. State, the Idaho Supreme Court held the district court abused its
discretion “[b]y not specifically addressing the appointment of counsel issue before dealing with
the substantive issues of [the petition].”  140 Idaho 789, 793 (2004).  The Court explained:  “At a
minimum,  the  trial  court  must  carefully  consider  the  request  for  counsel,  before  reaching  a
decision on the substantive merits of the petition and whether it contains new and admissible
evidence.” Id. at 794.  Here, the district court did not carefully consider Mr. Spokas’ motion for
appointment of counsel before reaching a decision on the merits of his petition.  Instead, in its
notice of intent to dismiss, the district court denied Mr. Spokas’ motion for appointment of
counsel without any analysis or explanation.  (R., p.19.)  The district court then summarily
dismissed Mr. Spokas’ petition without responding to his arguments with respect to his motion
6for appointment of counsel.  (R., pp.31-38.)  This was a legal error, which makes the district
court’s  decision  an  abuse  of  discretion.   As  in Charboneau, this Court must vacate the district
court’s judgment dismissing Mr. Spokas’ petition for post-conviction relief, and remand this case
to the district court with instructions to consider—and ultimately grant—Mr. Spokas’ motion for
appointment of counsel.  140 Idaho at 794.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in his Appellant’s Brief,
Mr. Spokas respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s judgment dismissing
with prejudice his petition for post-conviction relief, and remand this case to the district court
with instructions to grant his motion for appointment of counsel.
DATED this 15th day of November, 2017.
___________/s/______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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